Canada–U.S. intelligence sharing remains robust and case-by-case, governed by Canadian law and human rights considerations.

The security partnership with the United States supports counter-narcotics and other operations, with careful respect for legal rights in information sharing.

The report underscores intelligence concerns and their potential implications for national security and Arctic governance.

Canada’s intelligence community monitors foreign espionage activity in northern regions.

Arctic security dynamics are linked to Canadian policy, defense, and diplomatic considerations.

Russia uses commercial courier networks and the transportation sector to influence or undermine Canada, and efforts are underway to deny Russian operatives entry and flag Europe-based front companies tied to Russian agents.

European-front companies seeking to acquire goods have been flagged as potentially connected to Russian agents, prompting countermeasures.

CSIS is engaging with Indigenous, Arctic, and northern partners to share insights on national security in business and research involving foreign interests.

Inuit and territorial governments have been warned about national security considerations in foreign investments and opportunities.

CSIS has provided Inuit and territorial governments with information to weigh national security when pursuing opportunities with foreign companies and investors.

Espionage targets are shifting toward the private sector and academia, which hold advanced technology and data with strategic value.

Canada’s foreign affairs minister urged NATO to intensify Arctic focus to address eastern flank and northern challenges.

Countering violent extremism remains a major, though not sole, focus of CSIS work, alongside other security challenges.

Canada plans to bolster Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, including airports, seaports, all-season roads, and potentially a dozen patrol submarines under a C$1 billion initiative.

CSIS reports countering Iranian intelligence and proxies targeting dissidents in Canada, marking heightened focus over the past year.

Canada faces active intelligence pressures from China and Russia, with both nations seeking Arctic footholds and attempting to recruit Canadians with information and military expertise.

Non-Arctic powers, including China, pursue economic and strategic presence in the Arctic region.

Russia is characterized as an unpredictable Arctic state with a strong military footprint and aggressive behavior, influencing security dynamics in the north.

A 49-page report maps how Canadian technology appears in Russian weapons in Ukraine, while highlighting gaps in sanctions enforcement.

Canadians’ data increasingly reside abroad, raising risks that foreign jurisdictions could weaponize information and complicate data control.

CSIS is adapting to counter online radicalization and violent extremism, noting a rising share of terrorism investigations involving individuals under 18.

Rising radicalization risks amid eroding social cohesion and polarization are emphasized, with online-driven radicalization becoming more significant.

Violent extremism is on the rise in Canada, with close to 10% of terrorism investigations involving a subject under 18 and past attacks underscoring the threat.

Iranian intelligence services and proxies are a current focus for CSIS in countering transnational repression and potentially lethal actions in Canada.

Ongoing clandestine Iranian efforts to carry out lethal actions against Canadians remain a security concern, with monitoring of figures and potential threats.

CSIS has alerted Canadian firms about front companies connected to Russian agents to help counter activity and coordinate countermeasures.

Data now reside with foreign governments and corporations, enabling new avenues to weaponize information and threaten Canadian interests.

These spying and security concerns sit within broader geopolitical tensions between Western nations and Russia/China.

The Arctic is a strategic priority due to navigable routes and critical minerals, with related investments and tensions highlighted by CSIS briefings and government announcements.

A Globe and Mail report details a network funneling Canadian electronic and aerospace parts to Russia via Hong Kong, exposing gaps in sanctions enforcement.

Russia attempted to illegally acquire Canadian goods and technologies for its war in Ukraine through Hong Kong-based shell companies, with CSIS alerting firms and prompting protective actions.

Rogers condemns transnational repression and highlights Iranian intelligence threats targeting dissidents in Canada.