Australia’s decision to join the Iraq invasion in March 2003 was based on intelligence claims that Saddam Hussein hid a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, a claim that Prime Minister at the time says was compelling but ultimately incorrect.

The story reflects on how the events of 9/11 reshaped Western democracies, the ensuing outcomes of the Iraq War, and how assessments of those actions continue to unfold in a volatile international landscape.

Howard concedes that with accurate intelligence, Operation Iraqi Freedom might not have launched, suggesting the invasion could have followed a different global trajectory over the last quarter century.

Howard notes he did not believe Saddam was directly tied to 9/11, yet accepted that the Bush administration justified concerns about WMDs and their potential to fuel broader conflict in the War on Terror.

On September 11, 2001, Howard received a briefing in a Washington bunker that early Western responses could reference Iraq alongside al-Qaeda, with persistent concerns about Saddam’s purported weapons of mass destruction.

Howard argues he was not knowingly misled by U.S. or U.K. intelligence, and he offers a counterfactual: if the intelligence had shown Saddam lacked WMDs, the invasion decision might have been reconsidered.

Post-invasion investigations and UN inspections later suggested Baghdad had reportedly rid itself of WMD stockpiles years before the Coalition invasion, indicating the intelligence was disastrously wrong.