A vulnerability in the node-forge JavaScript cryptography library (CVE-2025-12816) allows bypassing signature and certificate validation by crafting malformed ASN.1 data that can pass validation checks due to an interpretation-conflict in ASN.1 handling in versions 1.3.1 and earlier.

The flaw enables an attacker to craft bogus ASN.1 structures that trigger cryptographic checks to be skipped, enabling authentication bypass, signed data tampering, or misuse of certificate-related functions.

The broader issue highlighted is that flaws in widely used open-source projects can persist after disclosure and patch availability, due to complex environments and testing requirements.

Security authorities note the impact may be significant depending on how cryptographic verification is used within an application and stress the need for timely patching.

The issue was discovered by Palo Alto Networks researchers and responsibly disclosed to node-forge maintainers, who patched the flaw earlier in the week.

Two external links accompany the report: the NVD entry for CVE-2025-12816 and CERT-CC’s advisory, providing context and validation of severity and impact.

node-forge is widely used in JavaScript environments for cryptographic and PKI functionality, with roughly 26 million weekly downloads on NPM, underscoring the potential scope of impact.

Maintainers released node-forge version 1.3.2, and developers are urged to upgrade immediately to mitigate risk.

The fix is available in version 1.3.2, and upgrading promptly is advised to prevent exploitation.

The vulnerability carries a high severity score of 8.6 out of 10, with significant implications for environments that rely on cryptographic verification for trust decisions.

CERT-CC’s advisory highlights the key risks of authentication bypass and tampering with signed data if the vulnerability is exploited.

The impact varies by application but includes authentication bypass, tampering of signed data, and misuse of certificate-related functions where cryptographic verification informs trust.

Hunter Wodzenski of Palo Alto Networks reported the flaw responsibly to the node-forge team, with a proof-of-concept showing how forged payloads could mislead the verification mechanism.