Russia’s intelligence services are stepping up efforts to steal Western technology and defense secrets as sanctions bite the wartime economy and limit Moscow’s ability to procure from Europe, targeting aerospace, quantum research, Arctic and marine tech, satellite systems, and advanced manufacturing.

There is evidence of cyber operations shifting from surveillance to disruptive actions, including a 2023-2024 attempt to attack a Swedish power plant, signaling a greater willingness to risk attribution to achieve strategic objectives.

Officials warn that Russian schemes may pull legitimate businesses into war supply chains inadvertently, underscoring the need for heightened corporate vigilance and sanctions enforcement.

Some waivers and oil-price dynamics have offered temporary budget relief, but analysts warn Moscow will face broader economic and strategic pressures by year’s end.

Assessments describe a shift in Moscow’s behavior toward bolder risk-taking and reduced concern about attribution, with President Putin’s war prospects appearing increasingly grim.

Estonian, Swedish, Finnish, and British intelligence leaders warn of a broader pattern of illicit efforts and increased risk to companies that could be pulled into Russia’s war supply chain.

The broader consequence is an elevated security burden on Europe’s private sector as organisations—from defence contractors to universities and logistics firms—could become entangled in Russia’s procurement networks and face cyber or legal risks.

Moscow’s methods are growing more sophisticated, using shell companies and third-country intermediaries to bypass sanctions, risking Western firms inadvertently entering Russia’s supply chain.

The war and sanctions have altered Russia’s strategic calculus, increasing willingness to risk detection to gain technological and military advantages.

Experts caution against assuming Russia will undergo political change solely due to economic hardship, given the regime’s resilience and distinct political dynamics.

Finnish intelligence officials, like their counterparts elsewhere, emphasize that economic strain does not automatically translate into political change in Russia.

Enforcement gaps mean sanctions bans don’t automatically halt covert procurement; coordination among customs, financial monitoring, due diligence, intelligence sharing, and prosecutions is essential, as intermediaries can obscure the final end user.